White House Releases National Security Science & Technology Strategy: What It Signals for CFIUS, Outbound Investment, and Export Controls 

As mandated by Section 10612 of the CHIPS and Science Act, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) issued the National Security Science and Technology Strategy (NSSTS), which implements the S&T priorities of the 2025 National Security Strategy. While framed as a technology strategy, the NSSTS previews concrete near-term action on CFIUS, outbound investment, export controls, and federal research security — direct touchpoints for clients in cross-border investment, controlled technology, and federally funded R&D. 

Key Takeaways 

  • CFIUS’ scope is set to expand. The Administration will seek authority, in consultation with Congress, to monitor high-risk “greenfield” investments and to expand CFIUS’s critical-technology jurisdiction, while continuing to calibrate scrutiny to an investor’s “verifiable distance” from adversary-linked actors under the America First Investment Policy’s allied fast-track approach. 
  • Outbound investment restrictions will broaden. Treasury will refine and likely expand the Outbound Investment Security Program (Comprehensive Outbound Investment National Security Act of 2025) beyond its current scope – AI, quantum, semiconductors, supercomputers, and hypersonics – to reach additional sectors implicated by China’s military-civil fusion strategy. Although the current NSSTS did not reference other countries by name, the strategy will likely be implemented in a way that circumvents particular investments in Hong Kong, Macau, Cuba, Iran, Russia, Iran, and North Korea – in line with President Trump’s “America-first investment policy,” published in February 2025. 
  • Export controls: deregulation and new restrictions in parallel. BIS is streamlining select controls (e.g., a […]

BIS End-Use Checks: What Happens When an Export Control Officer Calls Your Customer 

BIS has published a plain-language FAQ on its End-Use Check program, the on-site visits its Export Control Officers conduct at foreign consignees and end users of U.S.-origin items. This article explains what those visits are, what your foreign customer will be asked to produce, the statutory and regulatory authority behind the request, and the consequences when a check cannot be completed. It matters because the penalty for a failed check falls on the exporter’s ability to ship, not only on the foreign party being visited. 

Key Takeaways 

  • An End-Use Check (EUC) is BIS verifying, on site and overseas, that your foreign customer is who it says it is and used your items the way the license or the EAR required. 
  • A failed or incomplete check does not need a finding of wrongdoing to hurt you. The customer can land on the Unverified List, license exceptions disappear, and every shipment then requires a UVL statement. 
  • Since October 2022, a check that stays incomplete for 60 days after Unverified List placement, because a host government blocks it, triggers Entity List proceedings. 
  • The exporter’s exposure is set before the visit ever happens: by the accuracy of the license application, the quality of the paper trail, and whether the foreign party was told what to expect. 
  • Diaz Trade Law prepares exporters […]

Bosch Agrees to Pay $36 Million Penalty to BIS for Unauthorized Shipments to Huawei 

Robert Bosch GmbH (Bosch), the German multinational engineering and technology company, has agreed to pay a $36,184,680 penalty to the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) for exporting controlled items to Huawei Technologies Co. and its affiliates without the required U.S. government authorization. 

What Happened 

Between September 2020 and September 2024, Bosch exported approximately $72.4 million worth of Micro-Electro-Mechanical Systems (MEMS) sensor products and automotive software from abroad to Huawei and its affiliates. The exported items were subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) under the Foreign Direct Product Rule, a rule that extends U.S. export controls to certain foreign-produced items that incorporate U.S. technology or are manufactured using U.S. equipment. Because Huawei and its affiliates are listed on BIS’s Entity List, any shipment of items subject to the EAR requires a license from BIS. No such license or authorization was obtained. 

The MEMS sensors at issue are widely used in consumer products, including smartphones, wearable technology, and automobiles. 

The Penalty 

In addition to the $36 million BIS civil penalty, Bosch separately agreed with the Department of Justice to disgorge profits from the transactions, with an actual payment of approximately $3.6 million. BIS suspended approximately $3.6 million of its penalty as credit for the disgorgement, bringing Bosch’s total financial exposure to roughly $39.8 million. 

Bosch filed a Voluntary Self-Disclosure with […]

ICYMI: Technology Company Pleads Guilty to Export Control Violations, Agrees to $140M Fine

The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of California and the Counterintelligence and Export Control Section (CES) of the Department of Justice’s (DoJ) National Security Division announced that Cadence Design Systems, Inc. of San Jose, California, agreed to plead guilty to resolve criminal violations of export controls. 

As part of the plea agreement, Cadence will pay criminal penalties of nearly $118 million. 

In addition to the charges, the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) also announced the resolution of a civil enforcement action against the company in which Cadence agreed to pay over $95 million in civil penalties. 

The DoJ and BIS have coordinated the resolution of the parallel investigation, and each agreed to a partial credit against their fine for payments made to satisfy the other agency’s fine. Under the coordinated agreement, Cadence will pay criminal and civil penalties of more than $140 million.

Cadence committed criminal violations of the export control laws by selling hardware, software, and semiconductor design intellectual property to the National University of Defense Technology (NUDT) in China. NUDT was added to the Department of Commerce’s Entity List in February 2015. The university was involved in the development of supercomputers with applications for military and nuclear explosive simulations. 

Cadence and its Chinese subsidiary engaged in a conspiracy to commit export control violations by exporting this technology to NUDT without obtaining the requisite licenses from […]

DoJ Declines Prosecution of Company That Self-Disclosed Export Control Offenses

The Justice Department announced that it will not be prosecuting Universities Space Research Association (USRA) for violations of U.S. export control laws, citing prompt self-disclosure and cooperation.

EAR Violation

In 2016, USRA was granted a contract with NASA to license and distribute aeronautics-related and U.S. Army-owned flight control software. Jonathan Soong was employed by USRA and was responsible for performing due diligence on prospective purchasers. Soong willfully exported software subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to Beijing University, knowing that an export control license was required for the export because it was on the Entity List.

Soong used an intermediary to avoid detection, and embezzled tens of thousands of dollars in software license sales. He ultimately plead guilty to willfully violating the EAR. He was sentenced to 20 months in prison.

Company Disclosure & Remediation

Within days of learning of Soong’s actions, USRA self-disclosed the violation to the Department’s National Security Division (NSD). The company fully cooperated with the ensuing criminal investigation, which eventually established that Soong had acted alone.

USRA’s cooperation included proactively collecting and disclosing evidence and providing detailed and timely responses to the government’s requests for information. USRA remediated the root cause of the misconduct by disciplining an employee who failed to appropriately supervise Soong, and by improving its internal controls and compliance program.

USRA also compensated the government both for the funds Soong embezzled, and for the time Soong had spent embezzling funds instead of performing his duties under the contract with NASA.

The DoJ cited the timely disclosure, cooperation, and […]

By |2025-05-29T12:48:05-04:00May 7, 2025|EAR, Export|0 Comments
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