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October 2026

Call 305-456-3830 or email info@diaztradelaw.com.

Treasury’s First Outbound Investment Penalty: $200,000 Against Amidi LLC 

On October 7, 2026, the U.S. Department of the Treasury announced the first civil penalty issued under its Outbound Investment Security Program (OISP): $200,000 against Amidi LLC, the U.S. parent company of the organization known as Plug and Play Tech Center, for failing to notify Treasury of an investment its Chinese fund subsidiary made in a Chinese embodied artificial intelligence company. 

The underlying investment was approximately $92,478. U.S. investors, venture funds, accelerators, and corporates with offshore investment vehicles should take note: the notification obligation reaches transactions by a U.S. person’s controlled foreign entities, and Treasury has now penalized a missed filing on a small deal. 

Key Takeaways 

  • Treasury imposed a $200,000 civil penalty on Amidi LLC for failing to notify Treasury of an investment of approximately $92,478 in a Chinese AI and robotics company. 
  • The investment was made by Amidi’s Chinese fund subsidiary. The OISP regulations require a U.S. person to notify Treasury of a notifiable transaction by its controlled foreign entity. 
  • The current rules contain no general de minimis threshold for notification, and the existing regulations at 31 CFR Part 850 remain in effect while Treasury implements the COINS Act. 

What Happened 

On April 19, 2025, a Chinese fund owned by Amidi invested approximately $92,478 in Shanghai Qiongche Intelligent Technology Company Limited (Noematrix), […]

By |2026-10-09T11:26:45-04:00October 9, 2026|U.S. Department of Treasury|0 Comments
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A Warning for Importers: A CBP Prior Disclosure Does Not Count for DOJ

On October 1, 2026, DOJ’s National Fraud Enforcement Division issued Directive 26-12, which makes trade fraud a corporate enforcement priority and lists ten factors prosecutors must weigh in deciding whether to charge a company. In recent remarks, a government official added a point every importer should hear: a prior disclosure filed with CBP does not count as a voluntary self-disclosure for DOJ purposes. Importers, their executives, and the companies that buy from them, now face a dedicated DOJ trade fraud section, data-driven lead generation, and a sharp focus on country of origin. 

KEY TAKEAWAYS 

  • DOJ’s National Fraud Enforcement Division issued Directive 26-12 on October 1, 2026, listing customs-related fraud as one of four corporate investigation priorities and naming ten factors prosecutors must place great weight on when deciding whether to charge a company. 
  • A CBP prior disclosure is not a voluntary self-disclosure to DOJ. DOJ’s Corporate Enforcement Policy states that disclosures made only to regulatory agencies generally do not qualify. 
  • Country of origin fraud is the leading pattern. The government official said more than half of the trade fraud cases over the past year involved country of origin. 
  • Never filing an entry with CBP is not a defense. Earlier this year, a company pleaded guilty and paid a $6,382,000 fine for buying imported plywood it knew(or was willfully blind to the fact […]
By |2026-10-08T12:17:59-04:00October 8, 2026|U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)|0 Comments
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Your Data Is Still Not Your Own at the Border: The Second Circuit’s Alisigwe Ruling and CBP’s 2026 Device Search Directive 

On September 17, 2026, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in United States v. Alisigwe that the government needs neither a warrant nor any level of suspicion to manually search a traveler’s cellphone at the border, and it rejected four district court decisions within the circuit that had required a warrant. The ruling follows CBP’s replacement of its 2018 electronic device search policy with Directive 3340-049B, effective January 1, 2026. Business travelers, in-house counsel, and companies whose employees carry client, pricing, or technical data through ports of entry in New York, Connecticut, and Vermont should revisit their travel practices now. 

Key Takeaways 

  • The Second Circuit held that a manual search of a cellphone at the border is a routine search that requires no warrant and no suspicion, and that the First Amendment imposes no separate warrant requirement. 
  • The court expressly left open whether a forensic search, such as an off-site extraction of a phone’s data, requires reasonable suspicion. 
  • CBP Directive 3340-049B permits basic searches with or without suspicion and limits advanced (equipment-assisted) searches to cases involving reasonable suspicion or a national security concern, with supervisory approval. 
  • Under the directive, officers may not intentionally use a device to access information stored solely in the cloud, and a device that […]
By |2026-10-07T11:27:35-04:00October 7, 2026|Enforcement, International Law, International Travel, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)|0 Comments
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Commerce Restricts Polysilicon Stockpiling Ahead of December 4 Section 232 Tariffs: What Importers and Customs Brokers Need to Know 

On September 24, 2026, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published a temporary final rule at 91 FR 60505 establishing how the Department of Commerce will identify and restrict importers that stockpile polysilicon and polysilicon derivatives (Polysilicon Products) before the Section 232 minimum import prices and tariffs under Proclamation 11052 take effect on December 4, 2026. The rule caps weekly import volumes for new importers of record, creates a waiver process, and reminds customs brokers of their enforcement exposure. Importers of polysilicon, the covered HTSUS 3818 products, solar cells, and solar modules, along with the customs brokers that file their entries, are affected now. 

Key Takeaways 

  • BIS published a temporary final rule at 91 FR 60505 on September 24, 2026. It is effective September 22, 2026, through December 3, 2026. 
  • Commerce is monitoring existing importers of record (IORs). An IOR that Commerce determines is importing Polysilicon Products in volumes substantially greater than its historic averages will be prohibited from making further entries of those products prior to December 4, 2026. 
  • New IORs that registered with CBP on or after August 6, 2026, are prohibited from importing above fixed weekly quantities by HTSUS subheading, absent Commerce approval. 
  • Prohibited or restricted companies may apply to Commerce for a waiver at Polysilicon232@bis.doc.gov. Commerce intends to respond within 14 days of receipt. 
By |2026-10-06T08:14:29-04:00October 6, 2026|Customs Broker, Import, tariffs, U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)|0 Comments
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CBP Issues Palm Oil WROs Against Two Indonesian Producers: What Importers Need to Know 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) issued two Withhold Release Orders against palm oil and its derivative products produced in Indonesia by Mitra Aneka Rezeki and Hardaya Inti Plantation, directing detention of that merchandise at all U.S. ports of entry. The orders reach any importer whose palm oil or palm-derived inputs trace to either producer. Importers of food, personal care, cleanings, and industrial products should confirm whether either company sits anywhere in their supply chain. 

KEY TAKEAWAYS 

  • CBP issued two Withhold Release Orders (WROs) covering palm oil and its derivative products produced in Indonesia by Mitra Aneka Rezeki (MAR) and Hardaya Inti Plantation (HIP). CBP stated that, effective immediately, personnel at all U.S. ports of entry will detain that merchandise. 
  • CBP cited nine International Labour Organization (ILO) forced labor indicators at MAR and seven at HIP. With this action, CBP stated it now oversees and enforces 60 WROs and eight Findings under 19 U.S.C. § 1307. 
  • Under 19 C.F.R. § 12.43, an importer contesting a WRO detention submits tailored certificates of origin from the foreign seller or owner and a detailed statement from the ultimate consignee within 3 months after the date the article was imported stating that no forced labor was used in making the product. DTL’s read: that record takes longer to build than the deadline allows if the work starts at detention. 

What CBP Announced

According to CBP’s […]

By |2026-10-05T08:24:45-04:00October 5, 2026|Enforcement, Forced Labor, Import, Supply Chain, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)|0 Comments
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